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Abstract 
Experts are increasingly being called upon to build decision support systems. Expert 
intuitions and reflective judgments are subject to similar range of cognitive biases as 
ordinary folks, with additional levels of overconfidence bias in their judgments. A 
formal process of hypothesis elicitation is one way to mitigate against some of the 
impact of systematic biases such as anchoring bias and overconfidence bias. 
Normative frameworks for hypothesis or ‘novel option’ elicitation are available across 
multiple disciplines. All frameworks acknowledge the importance and difficulty of 
generating hypotheses that are a) sufficiently numerous b) lateral and c) relevant and 
d) plausible. This paper explores whether systematic hypothesis generation can 
generate the desired degree of creative, ‘out-of-the-box’ style options given that 
abductive reasoning is one of the least tractable styles of thinking that appears to shirk 
systematization. I argue that while there is no universal systematic hypothesis 
generation procedure, experts can be exposed to deliberate and systematic 
information ecosystems to reduce the prevalence of certain types of cognitive biases 
and improve decision support systems.  
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Introduction 
Decision-making research has thoroughly investigated how people choose from a set 
of externally provided options (Tobler et al., 2013). However, ill-structured real-world 
environments do not reveal all relevant options; instead options must be generated by 
the agent, usually by abductive reasoning. Can we design a system for effective option 
generation? We aim to build a back-end relational database with front-end social 
interface that facilitates effective and novel option generation amongst teams of 
experts (see visual inspiration Figure 1). The database provides a collective memory of 
options and the contexts under which they were developed. The database can be 
queried, e.g., to assist in the generation of options for the problem at hand. Our 
database motivates higher order, strategic queries—see metadata structure Figure 2. 
The social interface allows experts to build capacity in abductive reasoning. Our 
research explores whether systematic social hypothesis generation can mitigate against 
a subset of cognitive and motivational biases 
 
Background 
We draw on the sub-logics GEN, ENGAGE and DIS (Gabbay & Woods, 2005a, 
2005b) to solve “The Cut Down” problem of abduction—see Table 1. 
 
Sub-logic Description 
GEN Generation of hypotheses, resulting in a space of hypotheses Η. 
Members of Η are each a “possible hypothesis for possible conjecture” 
ENGAGE engages elements of Η relevant to the abduction problem into a proper 
subset Ρ⊂Η,  the set of relevant hypotheses for possible conjecture. In 
turn, the plausibility filter contracts Ρ into a set of possibilities for actual 
conjecture, represented by Δ. 
DIS transforms the plausible hypotheses into a premise (or premises) by 
subjecting it (or them) to a test filter of which Woods and Gabbay 
identify two varieties: ``The filter of independent confirmation" and 
``The filter of theoretical fruitfulness".  
Table 1. Description of Gabbay & Woods (2005a, 2005b) three sub-logics GEN, ENGAGE and DIS to 
solve ‘The Cut Down’ problem of abduction. 
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Figure 1: Visualization of Hypotheses in the user interface:  
Combination of the elemental attraction of fire, the conceptual  
spark of an idea and ethereal wild horse.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagram of underlying database logic. Evidence metadata includes both the 
justification evidence relative to a given hypothesis (binary voting, subjective 
description and drop-down argument type) and a quality assessment (subjective and 
automatically scraped from documents). 
Hypotheses  
are linked  
to evidence 
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Case Study 
We are running a case study by exposing experts working for an Online Travel 
Agency (OTA) to a deliberate and systematic information ecosystem to reduce the 
prevalence of certain types of cognitive and motivational biases to improve decisions. 
The OTA’s philosophy endorses the scientific method, particularly hypothesis 
generation and evaluation with data and experiments. Option generation is at risk at 
this agency because: 
 
1. hypotheses are not well grounded in evidence. 
2. not enough hypotheses are generated 
3. hypotheses iterate narrowly on previous hypotheses, leading to 
canalisation (see Figure 3) 
 
 
Figure 3: Canalisation in biology is a measure of the tendency of a population to produce the 
same phenotype regardless of variability of its environment or genotype. In organisations, employee 
beliefs can canalise, making them immune to evidence. 
 
We aim to reduce cognitive and motivational biases1 by using the Scientific Social 
System to: 
 
• Provide multiple and counter anchors 
• Prompt employees to consider reasons in conflict with anchors 
• Build explicit probability competence 
• Provide counterexamples and statistics 
• Capitalise on multiple experts with different points of view about hypotheses 
• Challenge probability assessments with counterfactuals 
• Probe evidence for alternative hypotheses 
• Encourage decision makers to think about more objectives, new alternatives 
• and other possible states of the future 
• Prompt for alternatives including extreme or unusual scenarios 
 
Functions of the user interface shape how experts generate, evaluate and justify 
decisions.  
                                                
1 Anchoring bias, Availability bias, Confirmation bias, Myopic problem 
representation, Omission of important variables & Overconfidence bias  
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Discussion  
Though the generation and evaluation of hypotheses is the basis of Bayesian 
rationality (Devitt, 2013; Gwin, 2011; Hajek & Hartmann, 2009; Henderson, 2013; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2009) we recognize the limits of Bayesian rationality as a 
satisfactory epistemology of reasoning and choice. Thus, we are designing an interface 
and database aligned with normative Bayesian principles and subjective explanatory 
justifications stemming from social interaction (see Douven & Wenmackers, 2015). 
In addition to better option generation, there are significant benefits to decision 
makers of having a robust and dynamic set of evaluated hypotheses across teams and 
work hierarchies to amplify collective intelligence (Nielsen, 2012). 
 
The work is especially relevant in terms of how decision makers can utilize employee 
subjective probabilities (potentially elicited from our interface and stored in our 
database) to evaluate the likelihood of strategic hypotheses being true with 
uncertainties explicit—see Figure 3 
 
Figure 3 Ascertaining the truth or falsity of a set of hypotheses given a set of outcomes characterised by 
binary data. In this example (N=20; R=15 positive answers). The top plot shows the outcomes. The 
bottom plot shows the posterior distribution for θ (Perez, 2016). 
 
In addition to better option generation, there are significant benefits to decision 
makers of having a robust and dynamic set of evaluated hypotheses across teams and 
work hierarchies to amplify collective intelligence (Nielsen, 2012) 
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